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Once a contracting ﬁrm has made the decision to bid on a project, it
is then faced with a more challenging decision which is to select a bid
price that is low enough to win the project and at the same time high
enough tomake a good proﬁt. A reasonable objective for each construc-
tion company is maximizing its proﬁt in order to ensure survival in the
market. However, while proﬁt maximization is usually the most fre-
quently used bidding objective [7], many researchers argue that it
should not be the sole criterion upon which the markup is based. A
contractor's need for work might sometimes play a conﬂicting role
with short-term proﬁt maximization and thus is identiﬁed as a major
factor when determining the optimum markup for a project [1,12,39].
For instance, if a contractor is in a bad ﬁnancial situation and is in urgent
need of cash ﬂow to cover its overhead and its general and administra-
tive expenses, winning the project becomes a priority even if it comes at
the expense of a much lower proﬁt. Thus, the need to continuously
cover some ﬁxed costs such as ofﬁces' rentals, utilities, personnel sala-
ries, insurance payments on property and equipment, and others
might sometimes drive the contractor to submit a very low bid in
order to at least breakeven and stay in the business. Moreover, the atti-
tude of a contractor towards risk is another primary factor inari), rita.awwad@lau.edu.lb
mbia.edu (I. Odeh).determining the optimummarkup for a project. Contractors have vary-
ing perceptions about market conditions and projects' uncertainties ac-
cording to their inner state, bidding preferences and risk tolerance [33].
In fact, a construction project can be considered as a lottery with differ-
ent proﬁt outcomes and with a level of uncertainty resulting from the
expected variance in the ﬁnal cost of the project. The value of this lot-
tery and its desirability differs from one contractor to another depend-
ing on their risk attitudes. Thus, it is important to consider the behavior
of a contractor towards risk when making decisions under uncertainty
such as the optimum markup decision, and in complex and risky envi-
ronments such as the construction ﬁeld. A third major component
that deﬁnes the markup choice by contractors and that is outside their
control is the intensity of competition in the market determined by
the number of potential opponents bidding on the same project and
their observed competitiveness degree. Contractors need to adjust
their proﬁt margins from one project to the other depending on the
change in the number or identity of competitors [9]. Someother less im-
portant factors affecting the optimal markup decision were also identi-
ﬁed in the literature such as type of project and inherent complexity,
client character and record of payment, reliability of subcontractors,
and the degree of uncertainty in cost estimates.
Several researchers listed and ranked the different factors a contrac-
tor takes into consideration when deciding whether to bid on a certain
project or not and determining which markup to use. Moreover, many
analytical and simulation models were presented in the literature that
provided insight into the complexities and dynamics of the bidding
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attribute nature of the bid/markup decision and devised approaches to
help contractors in making bidding decisions carefully. However, ﬁnd-
ings from such models remain mere theoretical recommendations
since topmanagement in contractingﬁrms keep relying on their subjec-
tive assessment, their experience and their intuition in determining
their optimum markup [1,11,16].
Themain contribution ofmulti-attribute biddingmodels is that they
reﬂected the invalidity of the homogeneous bidding behavior assump-
tion adopted in previously developed bidding models and paved the
way for a new set of studies emphasizing heterogeneity in bidding pref-
erences among contractors operating in the same environment and be-
tween groups of bidders operating in differentmarkets. For instance, Oo
et al. [32,33] designed bidding experiments to imitate the decision to
bid and optimal markup selection in two construction markets, Hong
Kong and Singapore, and showed that the two nations exhibited differ-
ent behaviors in response to four bidding factors, namely number of
bidders, market conditions, project type and size. Kim and Reinschmidt
[25,26] addressed the heterogeneity in the risk behavior of contractors
and used an evolutionary simulation approach to investigate its effect
on the markup decision, the contractor's success, and the market struc-
ture within a competitive environment. Ho and Hsu [23] also consid-
ered heterogeneity among contractors in their competitive advantage
over each other and followed a game theoretic approach to explore
the effect of several bid compensation strategies on encouragingbidders
to put more effort into project planning and tender preparation.
This paper focuses on three of the most inﬂuential bidding factors
identiﬁed in the literature namely, the market competition, the
contractor's risk behavior and his need for work. None of the prior stud-
ies discussed the interaction among the aforementioned markup deﬁn-
ing components and the relative dominance of oneon the otherwithin a
market of heterogeneous contractors exhibiting different bidding be-
havior and strategies. How does considering a contractor's need for
work in his markup decision affect his longterm performance in the
market? To what extent should a markup be adjusted to account for
need for work without compromising proﬁtability? How is this process
affected by the risk behavior of a contractor and how do these two com-
ponents interact? To answer the latter questions, this study presents an
agent-based simulation model of the construction bidding process
where contractors are modeled as autonomous agents competing on
projects over time which allows observing the long-term effect of a
contractor's risk attitude, his need for work and themarket competition
intensity on his optimal markup, his ﬁnancial growth and survival, and
his bid success rate. Hence, the three main objectives of this paper can
be summarized as follows: (1) observing the impact of a contractor's
risk attitude on his markup decision taking into account his need for
work and the market competition, (2) assessing if and to which extent
considering need for work in the markup decision affects the ﬁnancial
growth of a contractor and his market share, and (3) identifying emer-
gent market patterns in a diverse competitive environment exhibiting
different degrees of risk tolerance and different levels of need for work
considerations.
2. Previous works
Following the very ﬁrst statistical construction bidding models that
focused on the sole criterion of proﬁt maximization [8,19,21] in deter-
mining the optimal markup for a contractor, several multi-attribute
models were presented in the literature that emphasized the impor-
tance of considering multiple factors when making bidding decisions.
Indeed, the ﬁrst addition to the aforementioned proﬁt maximization
models was the introduction of the risk notion based on utility theory
and concepts. A group of studies emerged in this regard and focused
on the impact of the risk behavior of a contractor on his bidding deci-
sions [13,24,43]. Then, the literature on this topic went in two direc-
tions: a set of empirical studies that focused on deﬁning the mostinﬂuential factors in a contractor's optimalmarkup decision, and anoth-
er set of articles that attempted at modeling the multi-attribute nature
of the optimal markup decision using different approaches.
2.1. Multi-attribute nature of markup decision
Ahmad and Minkarah [1] presented the results of a survey adminis-
tered to US contractors to determine the main factors considered in
their bid/no bid and markup decisions. This study identiﬁed the
contractor's need for work, type of job, degree of hazard, economic con-
ditions, competition, degree of uncertainty in cost estimate, and reliabil-
ity of subcontractors among others as important factors in determining
the project markup value. Also, Shash [39] presented the ﬁndings of a
questionnaire that collected feedback from 85 top UK contracting
ﬁrms about the most prominent factors that affect their bidding deci-
sions and their weights. Degree of difﬁculty, risk involved, current
workload and need for work were identiﬁed as the most inﬂuential
ones among several other listed factors. Chua and Li [12] conducted in-
terviews with competitive bidding experts and top contractors in the
Singapore construction industry through which they identiﬁed the po-
tential level of competition, the inherent project risk, the contract
type, the company's biddingposition and its need for the job as essential
considerations in bidding decisions. In turn, Dulaimi and Shan [16] iden-
tiﬁed forty factors that medium and large size contractors in Singapore
perceive to be important when considering their bid markup decision.
These factors were classiﬁed into project characteristics, company's at-
tributes, bidding situation, economic environment, and project docu-
mentation. Furthermore, Ye et al. [45] presented a study that deﬁned
key factors contractors in China consider when preparing tender prices
for public projects. These factors were ranked and classiﬁed under dif-
ferent categories including construction cost, contractor heterogeneity,
payment terms, potential competitors, client requirements,market con-
ditions, and third-party stakeholders.
All of the aforementioned empirical studies identifying factors that
contractors take into consideration when faced with bidding decisions
highlighted that the ﬁrm's internal conditions (including need for
work, risk behavior, current workload, ﬁnancial capacity, ﬁrm size and
others) are equally and sometimes more important than project attri-
butes and market characteristics. In a study conducted by Ahmad and
Minkarah [1], need forworkwas identiﬁed as themost inﬂuential factor
in making a contractor “desperate to get the work”. Also, in his survey
about UK contractors, Shash [39] reiterated the observation that 90%
of the respondents identiﬁed need for work as the main incentive that
would make them take any measures to win the job. In fact, more
than 70% of contractors pass through situations where they are in ur-
gent need for the job and have to bid accordingly [12]. Hence, the
focus of this paper will be on studying to which extent the need for
work component affects the bid markup decision and the survival of a
contractor in a risky and competitive market.
2.2. Multi-attribute bidding models
Inspired by the former studies which highlighted key attributes that
form the basis of the bid markup decision, some researchers went fur-
ther to develop multi-attribute bidding models that can assist contrac-
tors in determining their optimal markup. For example, Seydel and
Olson [38] presented a quantitative method based on the analytical hi-
erarchy process that can be used by contractors to determine their opti-
mal markup for a particular project given their bidding preferences at
that time. This model took into consideration three factors in the mark-
up decision which are proﬁt maximization, risk exposure minimization
andworkforce continuity. On the other hand, DeNeufville and King [14]
focused on two inﬂuential factors in a contractor's bidding behavior
which are risk and need for work, and developed proﬁt markup utility
functions for different possible combinations of these two factors
based on an empirical investigation of the bidding decisions of 30
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veloped an optimummarkup estimation model based on artiﬁcial neu-
ral networks techniquewhichdetermines the best optimummarkup for
a certain project based on analogy with previous similar projects. The
bidding factors considered in their model were based on the ones iden-
tiﬁed in the survey conducted by Ahmad andMinkarah [1]. As for Dozzi
et al. [15], they also used some of the bidding criteria identiﬁed in
Ahmad and Minkarah [1] including market conditions, competition,
current workload and other factors based on which they developed a
utility theory model that can assist contractors in their markup selec-
tion. Fayek [18] used fuzzy set theory tomodel themargin-size decision
based on 93 bidding factors compiled from previous research [1,39].
Christodoulou [11] also combined neurofuzzy systems andmultidimen-
sional risk analysis algorithms to develop a bidding model that assists
contractors in their optimal markup decision. Then, Liu and Ling [30]
used fuzzy neural network technique to model the markup estimation
process by contractors. The model was based on data collected through
a survey of 29 large size contractors about the importance of several at-
tributes when determining the bid markup component. The study re-
vealed that payment record of client, competitiveness of other
bidders, availability of work, project complexity and the presence of
owner's special requirement were respectively the top ranked attri-
butes in the bid markup decision. Furthermore, Wang et al. [42] pre-
sented a simulation-based cost model that takes into account cost
uncertainties and amulti-criteria evaluationmodel that uses fuzzy inte-
grals to reﬂect the bidding preferences of the contractor in question. The
model recommends an optimal bid price to be tendered by the contrac-
tor based on several bidding factors classiﬁed under environmental,
project and company conditions as determined by previous studies.
These models do have insightful implications for the management
side of a construction ﬁrm and do reveal important information about
bidding practices and patterns in different construction markets; how-
ever, they are rarely used by construction professionals in actual
decision-making processes. Traditionally, contractors have not been re-
lying on any of the empirical or analytical bidding models presented in
the literature in estimating their bid markup values on tendered pro-
jects but they rather dependon their gut feeling, judgment and previous
experience [1,12,16,18,29]. Hence, the purpose behind this study is not
to offer one additional bidding model that serves the same objective as
the previous literature but rather to create a virtual experimental set-
ting that mimics the construction bidding dynamics to a large extent
in order to observe and understand how the different identiﬁed bidding
attributes interact together and inﬂuence each other. Speciﬁcally, this
paper uses the beneﬁts of agent-based modeling and simulation to ob-
serve how do three of the most inﬂuential bidding attributes
(contractor's risk attitude, need for work, and market competition)
make up the bidmarkup decision, affect the contractor's survival and ﬁ-
nancial growth on the long-term, and shape the market patterns.
3. Methodology & description of experiments
3.1. Simulation model
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is relatively a new development that
has found extensive use in areas such as economics, transportation, so-
ciology, biology, marketing, sales, and others [37]. ABM is a powerful
tool for modeling and analyzing complex environments where com-
plexity emerges from a large number of unknown and known variables
and autonomous interacting decision makers. In such problems, game
theory and mathematical models, considered as prescriptive ap-
proaches in decision science, cannot help alone and need to be integrat-
ed with agent-based modeling. For further reading on integration of
game theory and mathematical modeling with agent-based modeling,
Unsal and Taylor [41] and Awwad et al. [3] are suggested. Also, a com-
prehensive review of game theory applications in constructionmanage-
ment can be found in Asgari et al. [2].Recently, ABM has been used in some construction management ap-
plications as well such as infrastructure management [35], dispute reso-
lution [17], subcontractor selection [41], sustainable design and
management of the built environment [4,5,10,34], and competitive bid-
ding [3,25,26]. ABMproves to be very helpfulwhen it comes tomodeling
a collection of independent decision-making entities as agents that sense
and stochastically respond to emerging conditions in their local environ-
ments. Each agent assesses its individual situation, analyzes it in relation
to the other agents, and then makes decisions based on a set of devel-
oped rules [20]. Hence, ABM is a promising tool to mimic the complex
bidding process where contractors are considered as agents having dif-
ferent bidding behavior and strategies, and competing over projects
with varying characteristics for the purpose of achieving growing proﬁts
and survival. In this paper, the construction bidding environment is sim-
ulated using an agent-based approach where two classes of objects are
deﬁned, namely Projects and Contractors, for the purpose of studying
the interaction between different markup components and their long-
term inﬂuence on contractors' performance. Projects are generated se-
quentially over a simulation period of ten years and are assigned a set
of characteristics such as the project budget chosen uniformly over the
range [80, 120] M $, the project duration also selected uniformly be-
tween 20 and 30weeks, the project complexity (low or high), and its ac-
tual cost based on the inherent uncertainty. On the other hand, a set of
contractors is created in themarket along with their attributes including
their attitude towards risk, expertise, cost estimation skills, bidding com-
petitiveness, ﬁnancial status, work backlog and need for work, in addi-
tion to their decision making rules with respect to bidding on projects
and markup choice. Fig. 1 shows a schematic representation of the bid-
ding process simulation and reﬂects the interaction among the different
agents over time within one competitive environment. Several contrac-
tor agents are created in the market with different attributes that inﬂu-
ence their decision to bid or not on a certain project and their
subsequent selection of the optimal markup. For instance, a variable
called “working capital” is assigned to every contractor andmay increase
or decrease depending on the accumulated proﬁts or losses from won
projects. This variable is used to assess theﬁnancial situation of each con-
tractor in the market and thus affects directly his need for work, as indi-
cated through the unidirectional link between the two variables in Fig. 1.
Besides, a contractor's resources and expertise deﬁne the scope and
amount of work that can be performed at one point in time. Hence, if a
contracting ﬁrm has all its resources assigned to projects' tasks, then it
will not be in need for work. A third major attribute deﬁned under the
contractor agent is its risk attitude which is typically the byproduct of
the ﬁrm's culture and leadership. The ﬁrm's risk attitude determines
the way it perceives the inherent risk and complexity in a project and
hence affects the corresponding risk contingency embedded in theﬁrm's
bid price. The aforementioned internal attributes of each contractor in-
ﬂuence his markup choice in addition to other external factors such as
themarket competition and the project complexity, as shown in the Con-
tractor X box in Fig. 1. Looking at the big picture, the developed simula-
tion imitates the construction market environment which consists of a
group of heterogeneous contractors competing over a set of projects
with different characteristics generated throughout the simulation
time. Each project has a certain complexity level (low or high) which af-
fects the contingency component of the markup used by bidders on this
project as well as the project actual cost. The Contractor agent also in-
cludes among its attributes amarkup decision function that serves to de-
termine the optimal markup when bidding on a new project as will be
illustrated further in Section 3.2. Thismarkup percentage is a summation
of three components: (1) market competition inﬂuenced by the number
and competitiveness of opponents, (2) the contractor's need for work af-
fected by his ﬁnancial situation and the amount of work at hand, and
(3) the risk allowance which is a result of internal and external charac-
teristics, i.e., the contractor's risk tolerance and the project inherent un-
certainty. It is worth noting that the agent–environment boundary
represents the limit of the agent's absolute control, not of its knowledge.
Fig. 1. An abstraction of a contractor in the bidding environment and the network structure of the market.
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further details about the abstraction and deﬁnition phases of the simula-
tion model used in this study.3.2. Markup function
Using the agent-based approach to simulate the construction bid-
ding mechanism focuses on the heterogeneity feature among competi-
tors in their internal attributes such as their behavior towards risk,
ﬁnancial capacity, need for work, management expertise and others,
as well as their different perceptions of and reactions to external condi-
tions like market competition, availability of projects, and project risk
level among others. A set of parameters, variables and functions for
the two deﬁned agents, Contractors and Projects, are deﬁned as illus-
trated in the previous section. Besides, behavioral rules of agents are
also deﬁned in a simple and reasonable manner [31].
Every time a project is generated in themarket, the present contrac-
tors will evaluate their interest and capability to bid on this project
through a function called Shallbid(). This function checks if the
contractor's specialty and size can accommodate the project type and
complexity, and if the contractor's bonding capacity and current
amount of work allows for taking one more project with the respective
budget. The second critical decision that a contracting ﬁrm has to make
after deciding to bid on a project is the optimal markup to use in its bid
price. Thus, anothermain function developed for the agent Contractor is
themarkupdecision functionwhichdescribes howa contractor chooses
his markup value based on present external and internal circumstances.
A contractor's markup for a project is deﬁned as the sum of contingen-
cies and proﬁt and is expressed as a percentage applied to the project's
estimated cost including all direct and overhead costs [30]. A slight in-
crease in the markup value could lower the contractor's chance in win-
ning the project and consequently affect his proﬁtability and survival in
themarket. Since themain purpose of this study is to understand the in-
teraction between differentmarkup components and their inﬂuence on
the contractors' performance, it was assumed that contractors can esti-
mate a project cost with the same level of accuracy. This is to remove
any variability in bid prices and winning chances among bidders
resulting from cost estimation inaccuracies. It is also assumed that all
contractors have the same level of management capability and there-
fore uncertainties in the actual cost at which a project is completed re-
sult mainly from different levels of project complexities. Note that theactual cost is set to follow a triangular distribution with a mean equal
to the project's market budget.
This paper assumes that a typical contractor considers three criteria
when trying to determine themarkup for a certain projectwhich are the
market competition, the inherent risk, and the need for work. The latter
componentswere identiﬁed in the literature among themost inﬂuential
factors in a contractor'smarkupdecision.DeNeufville andKing [14] con-
ducted an empirical study which showed that each of the two compo-
nents, risk and need for work, causes independently and additively a
rough increase of 3% in the bid price of a contracting ﬁrm. Based on
the former study and tomaintain simplicity in behavioral rules, an addi-
tive markup function was developed in this study consisting of three
components described in the following subsections:
3.2.1. Competition component
Contractors consider themarket competition as their prime concern
whenpricing theirwork [40]. Bidders should adjust theirmarkups to re-
ﬂect the quality and quantity of competition displayed by their oppo-
nents [9]. Competitiveness of opponents is measured in this model
using the bid competitiveness ratio (BCR) expression introduced in
the study by Oo et al. [33] which determines the gap between an
opponent's bid and the lowest bid submitted for a project divided by
the lowest bid.
BCRip ¼
Bip  Blp
Blp
ð1Þ
where BCRip is the bid competitiveness ratio for opponent i on project p,
Bip is the bid price submitted by opponent i for project p, and Blp is the
lowest submitted bid for project p.
This ratio reﬂects how close an opponent's bid was to the lowest bid
for a previous project and thus the smaller this ratio is, the more com-
petitive the opponent is. During each bidding cycle, a contractor deter-
mines the average bid competitiveness ratios for his potential
opponents over the last ten projects tendered in the market using the
following code excerpt from the developed model:
//This piece of code shows how the BCRip of each contractor i is computed
and archived after determining the winning bid for every past project p//
for (Contractor c: get_Main().allContractors).
{
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c.bidCompetitivenessDataset.add(this.projectID,c.bid
CompetitivenessRatio);
}
//This piece of code shows how the average BCRip over the last ten pro-
jects, named bidCompetitivenessTen, is computed for each potential op-
ponent i on the current project p//
for (Contractor c: Opponents).
{
sum= 0;
for(int n= 0; n b c.bidCompetitivenessDataset.size(); n++)
{sum+= c.bidCompetitivenessDataset.getY(n);}
c.bidCompetitivenessTen= sum/c.bid
CompetitivenessDataset.size();
}
Then, once the average bid competitiveness ratios of potential oppo-
nents are determined, the contractor will be able to compare and rank
himself among his competitors and hence evaluate the percentage of
opponents who have been more competitive than him in the recent
past projects. The lower this percentage is, the highermarkup a contrac-
tor can afford to use in his bid price for the current project and thus the
higher the competition component will be in the developed additive
markup function.
3.2.2. Risk component
The risk attitude of a contractingﬁrm is part of its organizational cul-
ture and it may vary depending on the internal conditions of the ﬁrm
and the external conditions of the market within which it operates.
The construction industry encompasses a lot of hazards and uncer-
tainties, and thus, contractors have to consider all project complexities
when deciding to bid on a project and determining the bid price to ten-
der. However, contractors try to limit inﬂating their bid prices to keep
their competitive edge and rely on other ways tomitigate risk including
subcontracting large portions of their work, enhancing their cost esti-
mation and management skills, tailoring contract conditions such that
risks are shared with clients, and relying on claims after winning the
project [27]. Also, some identiﬁed risks at the bid pricing stage such as
possible inaccuracies in quantities or price estimates and anticipated
operational difﬁculties during project execution are typically accounted
for in the unit price estimates of the project pay items. But even after ap-
plying all former riskmitigation strategies, there remains some residual
risk that cannot be predicted or quantiﬁed and thus, has to be evaluated
and accounted for as a risk allowance in the bid price by the company's
decisionmakers. This type of risk is usually apportioned in a bid price as
part of the markup applied to the project cost and is dependent on a
combination of external factors such as market conditions and internal
factors such as the ﬁrm's circumstances. The range identiﬁed in the lit-
erature for residual risk allowance percentage in bids is in the order of
[0–3] % which was adopted in the presented model [14,27,40]. The
risk tolerance of a contractingﬁrmaffects theway it perceives the inher-
ent risk in a project and the impact it can have on the ﬁrm's bid price.
This study considers three levels of contractors' risk aversion (mild,
moderate and extreme) and two degrees of project risk (low and
high) which will be the two main factors deﬁning the risk contingency
component in the markup function as such:
if (riskAversion== mild)
{
if (project.riskLevel== low)
riskcontingency= 0.00;
if (project.riskLevel== high)
riskcontingency= 0.01;
}else if (riskAversion==moderate)
{
if (project.riskLevel== low)
riskcontingency= 0.01;
if (project.riskLevel== high)
riskcontingency= 0.02;
}
else (riskAversion== extreme)
{
if (project.riskLevel== low)
riskcontingency= 0.02;
if (project.riskLevel== high)
riskcontingency= 0.03;
}
3.2.3. Need for work component
A contracting ﬁrmneeds tomaintain a certainwork backlog in order
to cover its general and administrative costs and to be able to retain
skilled personnel. In the presented model, we deﬁned the parameter,
Work-in-Progress Limit, which indicates the average annual workload
a contractor can have during a year given its size and capabilities. Con-
sequently, the need forwork ratio is determined through comparing the
currentwork volume of a contractor against itsWork-In-Progress Limit.
The need for work ratio (NWR) for a contractor i is determined through
the following expression:
NWRi ¼ 1 Current Work VolumeWork in Progress Limit
 
: ð2Þ
The closer this ratio is to 1, the higher the need for work and the
lower the markup is expected to be; and the closer this ratio is to 0,
the lower is the contractor's need for work and the higher markup it
can afford. Through surveying contractors in the market, DeNeufville
and King [14] showed that a low need for work could cause a rough de-
crease of 3% in the bid price of a contracting ﬁrm. The need for work
component in this study is selectedwithin the range [0–4] % and its spe-
ciﬁc value is chosen based on two variables namely the ﬁnancial status
of the contractor and the need for work ratio deﬁned in Eq. (2). It is im-
portant to note here that this component, in contrast with the two pre-
viously discussed components, is a negative value indicating a decrease
in the markup in order to enhance the winning chance of a contractor
and thus accommodate his need for work. The ﬁnancial situation of a
contractor is assessed through the positive or negative change to its ini-
tialworking capital. Accordingly, there are six possible scenarios consid-
ered when determining the need for work component of the markup
value: a poor ﬁnancial situation with a low, moderate or high need for
work ratio, and a good ﬁnancial situation with low, moderate or high
need for work. The ideal situation is to have a contractor who is in a
good ﬁnancial status andwith enoughwork at hand and thus can afford
a zero decrease in its markup. And the worst combination would be a
contractor who is in a bad ﬁnancial shape and who has minimal or
zero work at hand. In this case, a contracting ﬁrm would be willing to
apply a decrease up to 4% to its markup in order to enhance its chance
in winning the project and covering its overhead costs. The main focus
of this paper is to investigate the long-term impact of considering
need for work within a risky and competitive environment, and to ob-
serve to what extent the need for work should be considered.
To sum up, the main assumptions of the paper are the following:
• All contractors have the same size, initial working capital (which is
zero), and general and administrative (G&A) costs.
• All contractors can estimate a project cost with the same level of
accuracy.
• All contractors have the same level of management capability and
expertise.
14 S. Asgari et al. / Automation in Construction 65 (2016) 9–20• The actual cost is set to follow a triangular distribution with a mean
equal to the project's market budget.
• All contractors consider three criteria when trying to determine the
markup for a project: the market competition, the inherent risk, and
the need for work.
• All contractors have access to their competitors' bidding history.Table 2
Summary of the experiment sets 1, 2, and 3.
Experiment
set
Purpose Experiment conditions3.2.4. Example application
In this section, a numerical application is conducted to illustrate the
markup determination by a Contractor agent in the simulated bidding
model. We consider the case of Contractor C1 who is informed about a
newly adverstised project in the market for which he decides to submit
a bid after evaluating his bidding capacity using the Shallbid() function.
C1 expects to be competing on this project with three other contractors
in the market C2, C3, and C4 for which he computes the average bid
competitiveness ratio (BCR) based on the last ten tendered projects in
the market as shown in Table 1. Based on the former computations,
C1 ranked second among his three opponents in recent prior projects
and thus he has been more competitive than 2/3 of his opponents.
Assuming that C1 typically chooses his markup within a range of [5–
9] %, the algorithm takes competition into effect through choosing a spe-
ciﬁc value from this range based on the competitiveness of C1 relative to
his opponents. In otherwords, if C1has a lower BCR (i.e., ismore compet-
itive) than 80% of his opponents, he can afford to use the highest value in
his range, 9%, as his markup competition component. On the other hand,
if C1 has a BCR lower than only 20% of his opponents, he has to go down
to the lowest end of his range, 5%. Following the same logic, the markup
values between the two range boundaries are chosen in accordancewith
20% increments of BCR values. As such, having a current BCR that is lower
than 2/3 of his opponents, C1 chooses 8% as the competition component
of his markup value. This value is now adjusted by C1 to account for his
need for work and the project risk. Assuming that C1 is an extremely risk
averse contractor and the current project he is bidding on incorporates
lot of hazards and uncertainties, the risk contingency that will be applied
by the developed algorithm is 3% which is the upper bound of the risk
component. Finally, the need for work component depends on C1's
need for work ratio (NWR) and his ﬁnancial capacity. C1 is currently
working on 4 projects and his Work-in-Progress Limit is 5, hence, his
NWR is equal to 0.2. This means that C1 has a minimal need for work
and thus can afford a high markup. Assuming a good ﬁnancial capacity
for C1 and given the need for work range of [−4, 0] %, a 0% decrease is
chosen by themodel as the need for work component. In summary, con-
tractor C1 will use a markup of 11% (=8 + 3− 0) on this project after
taking into account all internal and external conditions.
3.3. Description of the experiments
This subsection explains the details of three sets of simulation experi-
ments conducted in this study. A set of contractors are deﬁned in theTable 1
Bid prices of opponents on last ten tendered projects.
Project C1 bid
price
C2 bid
price
C3 bid
price
C4 bid
price
BCR
for C1
BCR
for C2
BCR
for C3
BCR
for C4
(M $) (M $) (M $) (M $)
P1 85 92 78 – 0.089 0.179 0 –
P2 95 105 102 110 0 0.105 0.074 0.158
P3 112 107 – 120 0.047 0 – 0.121
P4 75 80 82 90 0 0.066 0.093 0.2
P5 83 80 90 86 0.037 0 0.125 0.075
P6 120 110 125 113 0.091 0 0.136 0.027
P7 – 88 83 90 – 0.060 0 0.084
P8 105 110 123 120 0 0.048 0.171 0.143
P9 90 78 83 85 0.154 0 0.064 0.089
P10 115 95 110 105 0.211 0 0.158 0.105
Average bid competitiveness ratio: 0.069 0.046 0.091 0.111market and are set to have the same value for initial working capital,
Work-in-Progress Limit, and cost estimation and project management
skills. Each contractor can simultaneously work on four projects at most.
Given the number of contractors in the market and their work limit, the
market is considered very competitive in all sets of experiments since
most contractors participate in all biddings. Each experiment set has
been run for 100 times in order to ensure the consistency of the results.
Table 2 presents a summary of the experiments sets and their purposes.
The purpose of the ﬁrst set of experiments is to examine what level
of risk attitude results in the contractor's best ﬁnancial performance on
the long run. Results will be compared with ﬁndings in the literature in
order to check and verify capability of the simulation model. There are
nine contractors competing with each other in the market including
three slightly risk averse contractors, three moderately risk averse con-
tractors, and three extremely risk averse contractors.
Table 3 shows the risk attitude assigned to each of the nine contrac-
tors. In the ﬁrst set of experiments, projects are generated in themarket
one at a time unit under three different scenarios. Under scenario 1, all
projects have a low level of complexity and uncertainty. Under scenario
2, the market comprises a mix of projects with low and high level of
complexity and uncertainty. In this case, every time a project is generat-
ed, its complexity is chosen randomly with a probability of 50% being
low and 50% being high. As for scenario 3, all projects have a high
level of complexity and uncertainty. These three scenarios are consid-
ered only in the ﬁrst set of experiments in order to analyze the impact
of project risk on the results.
The second set of simulation experiments investigates the impor-
tance of the component “Need for Work”. It aims at assessing whether
considering “Need for Work” impacts the business success of contrac-
tors on the longtermor not. In this experiment set, two types of contrac-
tors were considered with ten contractors in total. As shown in Table 3,
there are ﬁve contractors whodo not consider “Need forWork” and ﬁve
other contractors who consider it and accordingly discount their mark-
up up to 2%. Financial performance of the two sets of contractors is ob-
served and compared in order to evaluate the impact of considering
“Need for Work” in markup selection on the contractor's performance.
As for the third set of experiments, they aimed at determining to what
degree a markup discount should be considered in order to account
for need for work without compromising the business success of the
contractor. Five types of contractors were considered in this experiment
with ten contractors in total. These ﬁve sets differ by the discount level
they apply to their markup in order to take into consideration the “Need
for Work” component.1 Finding the optimal level of risk
attitude for contractors
Scenario 1: the market
comprises only projects with
low level of complexity
Scenario 2: the market
comprises a mix of projects
with low and high level of
complexity
Scenario 3: the market
comprises only projects with
high level of complexity
2 Finding whether considering
“Need for Work” impacts business
success of contractors
The market comprises a mix of
projects with low and high
level of complexity.
All contractors are moderately
risk averse
3 Finding to what degree a markup
discount should be considered to
account for need for work
The market comprises a mix of
projects with low and high
level of complexity.
All contractors are moderately
risk averse.
Table 3
Contractors' characteristics in the experiment sets 1, 2, and 3.
Contractor Risk attitude in the experiment set 1 Need for work in the experiment set 2 Need for work in the experiment set 3
#1 Slightly risk averse Ignored Ignored
#2 Slightly risk averse Ignored Ignored
#3 Slightly risk averse Ignored Discounted up to 1%
#4 Moderately risk averse Ignored Discounted up to 1%
#5 Moderately risk averse Ignored Discounted up to 2%
#6 Moderately risk averse Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 2%
#7 Extremely risk averse Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 3%
#8 Extremely risk averse Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 3%
#9 Extremely risk averse Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 4%
#10 N.A. Discounted up to 2% Discounted up to 4%
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themarkup function of the ten deﬁned contractors. It is worthmention-
ing that the second and third sets of experimentswere conducted under
three levels of risk attitude separately in order to ensure that results are
consistent regardless of the risk behavior of contractors. Also, the mar-
ket consisted of a mix of low and high risk projects (similar to the sce-
nario 2 under the ﬁrst set of experiments) in both sets.
4. Results & discussion
This section presents and discusses the results that were obtained in
the three sets of experiments described in Section 3.3.
4.1. Experiment set 1
Figs. 2 to 5 aswell as Table 4 and Table 5 present the results obtained
for the ﬁrst experiment set. In particular, Figs. 2 to 4 show the progress
of the averageworking capital for the three levels of risk aversion versus
the project ID under the three different described scenarios which ex-
hibit varying degrees of project risk. As shown in each of these ﬁgures,
moderately risk averse contractors ﬁnancially outperform others in
highly competitive markets in the long run. This result is consistent
across all scenarios and is aligned with results from the literature [3,
25,26]. Also, slightly risk averse contractors outperform extremely risk
averse contractors in all scenarios. One of the methods for validating
simulationmodels is comparing obtained resultswith real-world obser-
vations or ﬁndings from the literature and in this case, we can consider
this experiment set as a validation tool for the simulation model.
Comparing Figs. 2, 3, and 4, it is observed that slightly risk averse
contractors can do better in riskier markets. Slightly risk averse, on av-
erage, have the highest difference in working capital with moderately
risk averse contractors when the market comprises low-risk projects
(Scenario 1). This gap decreases when moving from low risk to high
risk market; namely, from scenario 1 to scenario 2 and then scenario
3. This can be due to the fact that when facing high uncertainty in pro-
jects, the more risk averse a contractor is, the higher the allocatedFig. 2. Financial performance of contractors incontingency (risk allowance) in his bid which reduces his competitive-
ness. This gives a winning edge to slightly risk averse contractors over
moderate ones, and thus the gap between the growingworking capitals
for both decreases from scenario 1 to scenario 3. Another observation
about Figs. 2, 3, and 4 is that, given a certain risk aversion level, the gen-
erated working capital representing an accumulation of actual project
proﬁts over time has increased from low to high risk market since all
contractors are expected to allocate a higher risk allowance in their
markup to hedge against high level of risk in projects.
Table 4 presents the working capital of contractors in the three sce-
narios. It also compares each contractor's performance with the best
performance in the market in terms of working capital. It can be ob-
served that average working capitals of contractors have increased
from scenarios 1 to 3. In other words, in riskier markets, contractors in-
creased their markups to cover higher risks and thus were able to earn
higher proﬁts. It is also observed that moderate risk averse contractors
had the smallest average gap (Δ%) with the best performer in the mar-
ket in all scenarios which again indicates that moderation in risk atti-
tude is the optimal strategy regardless of the project risk level. Note
that contractors #5 and #6 exhibited the best ﬁnancial performance in
all three scenarios (Δ= 0%). Another important observation that was
emphasized earlier is that slightly risk averse contractors performed sig-
niﬁcantly better under scenario 3 where the average Δ% dropped from
−41% in scenario 2 to−24% in scenario 3.
Table presents the market share of the nine contractors under the
three different scenarios. The market share of each contractor i is de-
ﬁned as such:
Market share i ¼
#of won projects by i
#of tendered projects in the market
 100: ð3Þ
This table supports again the conclusion that moderately risk averse
contractors, on average, have a better performance under all market
scenarios through having the highest share of projects among the
three types of contractors.the experiment set 1 under scenario 1.
Fig. 3. Financial performance of contractors in the experiment set 1 under scenario 2.
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tionperiod. The success rate of a contractor i is deﬁned as per the follow-
ing equation:
Success ratei ¼
#of won projects by i
total#of projects i has bid on
: ð4Þ
This ﬁgure conﬁrms that moderately risk averse contractors, on av-
erage, outperform other contractors. Moreover, there exists a conver-
gence to a somehow constant success rate for each contractor after 2–
3 years (in the simulation time scale). It is worth noting that the result
in Fig. 5 is obtained from several simulation runs of experiment 1
under scenario 2.
4.2. Experiment set 2
The results of the second set of experiments, as reﬂected in Fig. 6,
show that contractors #6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 who considered “Need For
Work” as one of the criteria for determining their markup have a better
ﬁnancial performance in comparison with the contractors who did not
(#1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). This could be explained by the fact that these con-
tractors lower their markup strategically depending on their need for
work and ﬁnancial situation which allow them to acquire new projects
when they have their resources idle, despite that it might be at the ex-
pense of lower expected proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, this ﬂexibility is of more
help to contractorswhen risk level of projects is low andmarket compe-
tition is intense. It is worth noting that this experiment set is conducted
with the same risk aversion degree for all contractors in order to isolate
the “Need for Work” effect on contractors' growing capital. Fig. 6 shows
the results obtained for moderate risk aversion level. However, the sim-
ulation was repeated another two times, once with mild risk aversion
condition for all contractors and the other with extreme risk attitude.
Both scenarios showed similar results.Fig. 4. Financial performance of contractors in4.3. Experiment set 3
While considering “Need for Work” is a reasonable strategy for con-
tractors, the extent to which this consideration should be accounted for
in themarkup percentage has not been studied in the literature. The ex-
periment set presented in this section addresses this gap through hav-
ing ﬁve different groups of contractors in the market who perceive the
importance of “Need for Work” consideration differently and thus allo-
cate different boundaries to this criterion in their markup functions.
Fig. 7 shows the experiment results where the growing capitals for the
ﬁve groups of contractors are presented versus the project Id. It is ob-
served that contractors 1 and 2 who do not take their need for work
into consideration in their markup decisions performed the worst,
whereas, contractors 7 and 8 who adopted a need for work upper mar-
gin of 3% had the best ﬁnancial performance. Contractors 5 and 6 came
in the second rank with using an upper limit of 2%. As for contractors 9
and 10 who discounted their markup up to 4%, they increased their
chance of winning the project while decreasing the proﬁt margin radi-
cally. On the other hand, contractors 3 and 4 who discounted up to 1%
were most probably not able to immediately secure a contract when
they need it. Based on the aforementioned, it can be concluded that con-
sidering “Need for Work” strategically and discounting the markup up
to 2–3% is the optimal policy for contractors in a competitive market
on the long run. All contractors whose working capitals are shown in
Fig. 7 were assigned a moderate risk aversion degree. It should be
noted again that this experiment was conducted under different con-
tractors' risk behavior (slightly and extremely risk averse) and the re-
sults were consistent regardless of the risk attitude.4.4. Summary of research ﬁndings
The aforementioned conducted experiments and scenarios revealed
several ﬁndings which can be of signiﬁcant use to contractors, theirthe experiment set 1 under scenario 3.
Fig. 5. Contractors' success rate under scenario 2.
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bidding strategies. Disregarding the need for work component, it was
shown that moderately risk averse contractors consistently outperform
other contractors in all market conditions including all levels of project
risk whereas extreme risk aversion is the least effective strategy under
all circumstances. Another interesting and not so intuitive observation
is that the higher the projects' risk and uncertainty within the market,
the more competitive slightly risk averse contractors are where they
tend to exhibit a close ﬁnancial performance to moderately risk averse
contractors. This implies that in a riskier market, a contractor can afford
to be more risk tolerant and still maintain a proﬁtable business.
Furthermore, the study showed that a contractor who takes into
consideration his need for work in his markup choice has a signiﬁcantly
better ﬁnancial performance on the long term than one who does not.Table 4
Contractors' working capital in the experiment set 1 under scenarios 1, 2, and 3.
Working capital ($M)
Scenario 1 Δ% with the best performance Scenario
Contractor 1 237 −25% 170
Contractor 2 90 −72% 292
Contractor 3 155 −51% 198
Average of Contractors 1, 2, 3 161 −49% 220
Contractor 4 260 −18% 346
Contractor 5 318 0% 271
Contractor 6 269 −15% 372
Average of Contractors 4, 5, 6 283 −11% 330
Contractor 7 163 −49% 207
Contractor 8 167 −47% 158
Contractor 9 112 −65% 194
Average of Contractors 7, 8, 9 147 −54% 186
The bold values are basically the average of the three above values.
The underlined value shows the highest value in a scenario.Based on the simulations studying different consideration levels for
the need for work component, it was observed that 2 to 3%markup de-
crease accounting for the contractor's need for work led to higher
contractor's chance of ﬁnancial growth. A higher discount may allow
the contractor to win more projects but will have a detrimental effect
on his ﬁnances. Therefore, the optimal policy can be concluded to be
moderation in both dimensions of risk attitude and need for work. At
the limit, not considering need forwork and being extremely risk averse
appeared to be the least effective strategy a contractor can adopt. Thus, a
contractor needs to be cautious when discounting his markup to ac-
count for his need for work in such a way to create a balance between
earning enough proﬁt and securing the needed amount of projects. Fi-
nally, the results obtained from all sets of experiments converged to-
wards the same observation of a market equilibrium reached under2 Δ% with the best performance Scenario 3 Δ% with the best performance
−54% 294 −28%
−22% 299 −27%
−47% 345 −16%
−41% 313 −24%
−7% 321 −21%
−27% 382 −6%
0% 408 0%
−11% 371 −9%
−44% 202 −50%
−58% 234 −43%
−48% 224 −45%
−50% 220 −46%
Table 5
Contractors' market share in the experiment set 1 under scenarios 1, 2, and 3.
Market share
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Contractor 1 12.3% 10.6% 10.9%
Contractor 2 9.0% 11.9% 10.9%
Contractor 3 10.9% 10.9% 12.3%
Average of Contractor 1, 2, 3 10.7% 11.1% 11.4%
Contractor 4 12.9% 12.3% 11.9%
Contractor 5 13.1% 12.1% 13.1%
Contractor 6 12.9% 13.4% 12.3%
Average of Contractor 4, 5, 6 13.0% 12.6% 12.4%
Contractor 7 9.6% 9.8% 9.6%
Contractor 8 10.2% 9.2% 9.4%
Contractor 9 9.0% 9.6% 9.4%
Average of Contractor 7, 8, 9 9.6% 9.5% 9.5%
The bold values are basically the average of their three above values.
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tion about their competitors and adjusted their strategies accordingly.
4.5. Veriﬁcation & validation
Veriﬁcation is the process of determiningwhether the programming
implementation of the abstract model is correct whereas validation is
the process of determining whether the conceptual model is a reason-
ably true representation of the real world for the purpose of answering
the research questions [28]. In other words, veriﬁcation is concerned
with solving the problem right while validation is concerned with solv-
ing the right problem [44]. There are numerous methods with different
levels of rigor for veriﬁcation and validation of simulation models, par-
ticularly agent-based models. Depending on the type of the model andFig. 6.Working capital of moderately risk aveavailable data, a method may be applicable for veriﬁcation and valida-
tion; a model should be veriﬁed and validated to the degree needed
for the model's intended purpose or application [36]. The agent-based
simulation platform used in this study, AnyLogic, allows the user to
breakdown the model into several computation steps and verify the
programming component of each step due to its capability of collecting
information on any parameter or process at any time through the simu-
lation. For some speciﬁc bidding cycles in several simulation runs, the
corresponding calculations of all the process stepswere computedman-
ually, compared and veriﬁed with the model calculation.
One of the most prevalent validation methods is “model-to-model
comparison”where the results of the simulation are compared with pre-
vious studies on the subject. As mentioned previously, results of the ﬁrst
set of experiments were alignedwith the literature [3,25,26]; moderately
risk averse contractors outperform other contractors in competitive mar-
kets given any level of project risk. Kim and Reinschmidt [25,26], using an
evolutionary model in which contractors choose their markup according
to their risk attitude and project uncertainty, showed that moderately
risk averse contractors are more successful than the others. Also,
Awwad et al. [3] reached the same conclusion. They developed an
agent-based environment where contractors use a mathematical model
that integrates utility theory and Friedman's model (1956) to determine
an optimal markup according to contractors' risk attitude and themarket
competition. Another validation method used in this study was parame-
ter variability (sensitivity analysis) where we closely examined how un-
certainty in the values of the main input parameters can impact the
model output. In addition, different distributions were used for project
budget, estimated duration, actual cost, and actual duration in addition
to the fact that all experiments were conducted under different scenarios
in order tomake sure results are consistent. For example, experiment sets
2 and 3 were conducted with three different contractors' risk attitudes.rse contractors in the experiment set 2.
Fig. 7.Working capital of moderately risk averse contractors in the experiment set 3.
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model, is based on some assumptions. One important assumption was
that contractors have access to other contractors' bidding history. With
respect to validation of model assumptions, it is worth mentioning that
many contractors have a speciﬁc unit in their business development, typ-
ically a Research & Development department, that is in charge of
collecting market information, tracking and analyzing their competitors.
On the other hand, it was assumed that all contractors have the same
size, initial working capital, cost estimation accuracy, construction man-
agement skills, expertise, andG&A costs in order to avoid anypossible im-
pact of these factors on the results. Concerning validation of the markup
determination, the selection of these three additive and independent
criteria is supported by a thorough literature review presented in the re-
lated work and methodology sections of the paper. As for the structural
validation of the simulation, the bidding process used in the simulation
model imitates the actual bidding process happening in reality.
5. Conclusion and future works
Markup decision can massively impact a contractor's ﬁnancial per-
formance because the primary channel of securing work in the con-
struction industry is still through a variety of competitive bidding
mechanisms. The presented study used agent-basedmodeling as an ap-
propriate framework for analyzing and investigating the impact of risk
behavior and need for work on construction contractors' performance
in a competitive bidding environment. Prior to applying agent-based
modeling in this study, the authors had ﬁrst to conduct an extensive lit-
erature review in order to build a rule-based and descriptive markup
decision model that replicates the behavior of contractors. The devel-
oped model built on previous analytical and empirical studies about
contractors' bidding parameters and markup considerations and com-
bined all these attributes and functions into a comprehensive agent-
based model that reﬂects many of the complexities of the bidding pro-
cess. Different combinations of risk behavior, need for work andmarket
competition were simulated and their implications on the contractor's
business and the market as a whole were observed and analyzed. This
model can serve as a virtual simulation lab that can be used by any po-
tential user (contractor, consultant or owner) to evaluate and compare
different bidding strategies, markup behaviors, and bid tendering ap-
proaches and to learn about resulting emergentmarket patterns. In par-
ticular, this study provided contractors with invaluable insights into the
impact of considering need for work on their ﬁnancial performance and
to what extent this consideration should be taken into account. It was
shown that moderation in both dimensions of risk allowance andneed for work is the optimal bidding strategy for contractors in compet-
itive environments. At the limit, this model can be used by a contractor
to compare different markup functions that he may wish to adopt in
order to evaluate which would most beneﬁt his business on the long
run.
The authors suggest that future works can focus on adaptive risk atti-
tude in twomain directions. The ﬁrst step is to study contractors' organi-
zational culture and risk behavior in order to ﬁnd out whether and when
contractors change their risk attitude. This would help identifying what
information and signals contractors look for in themarket or their organi-
zation in order to actmore or less risk averse. Second, newmethodologies
such as reinforcement learning can be used to help contractors design the
optimal dynamic strategy according to their organization, competition,
andmarket conditions. This strategy can be later experimented and com-
pared against other strategies in the virtual lab designed and developed
by the authors using agent basedmodeling. Furthermore, some of the as-
sumptions used in this paper can be enhanced in the future version of the
model. For instance, the number of contractors in the market was kept
ﬁxed in this study and there was no newcomer or quitter from the mar-
ket. Also, the size of a contracting ﬁrmwas considered constant through-
out the simulation while it is not always the case in reality. In future
studies, new behaviors for contractors such as entry, exit, expansion, con-
traction, alliance, and merging can be deﬁned and added to the model if
aligned with the purpose of the research. As we tried to apply a variety
of validation methods, validation of the model through expert judgment
is still crucial [6]. As part of future work, the simulationmodel can be val-
idated by comparing its resultswith real case studies or by presenting it to
and getting feedback from practitioners and professionals in the ﬁeld of
construction bidding.Acknowledgments
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